"HIS HEART EXPOSED TO PRYING EYES,
TO PITY HAS NO CLAIM":

REFLECTIONS ON
HOGARTH AND THE
NATURE OF CRUELTV
LAWRENCE FINSEN

i terns of co=n moral currency and is thus
less controversial than some claims on behalf
of anirrals might be.

University of Redlands
In his famous discussion of the source
of our duties concerning anirrals, the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant approvingly mentions a series of engravings ( "The Four
Stages of Cruelty") by the English artist
William Hogarth as exemplifying one of his
central contentions. [2] The approach to our
duties regarding anirrals advocated by Kant
holds that avoiding cruelty is the most fUndamental duty we can have to nonhuman animals. For convenience, I shall refer to this
view as the "No-Cruelty" j:X)sition. It is not
surprising that Kant cites Hogarth while
explaining his own views;
Hogarth's engravings provide a rich visual statement about
the nature of cruelty and the moral status of
its victims.

Nevertheless, with the rise of various
critiques of traditional assUIUptions regarding the rroral status of animals, the appeal
to avoiding cruelty as a foundation for our
duties concerning animals has been abandoned
Understanding why this has
by many today.
occurred is partly a matter of UI1derstanding
why traditional assumptions about the moral
status of animals are so UI1satisfactory.
Despite differences among those critical of
these assumptions, I take it that a common
feature of many is rejection of speciesism.
The No-Cruelty view appears to many to be a
relic of an era in which those who would
assist animals shared the speciesistic outlook of those against whom animals needed
protection.
Implicitly, the No-Cruelty view
is seen as failing to give proper place to
the value of the animals themselves.

That there is a duty to avoid cruelty is
not very controversial;
condemning cruelty
is somewhat analogous to condemning child
abuse.
The existence of such a duty is sufficiently obvious that arguing for its existence would be unnecessary in most contexts.
This is so even with respect to the duty as
applied strictly in the case of nonhuman
animals. Moreover, thinking about our duties
with respect to an:im3.ls in tenns of avoiding
cruelty is a common way of approaching the
subject.
Legislation "protecting" animals,
for example, is often presented under the
rubric of "prohibiting cruelty," and many of
Ule
traditional organizations that
have
worked for improved treatment of animals have
shared this view, describing their task eiUler as "the prevention of cruelty" of as
"the promotion of humaneness."[3] These are
but two examples of the ways in which the
notion of cruelty is deeply embedded in our
way of thinking about the evils done to animals.
As a result, the appeal to avoiding
cruelty as the central claim on behalf of
animals has the advantage that it appeals to
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I
believe that these criticisms are
appropriate.
The arguments for re-thinking
our fundamental ideas about
human-animal
relations are well known and need not be
repeated here. [4] Nevertheless, in my experience, it is still common for people, even
those who would identify themselves with the
anirral rights movement, to focus primarily
uj:X)n cruelty in thinking about treabnent of
animals they consider UI1ethical. This raises
the question of what role this concept should
play in a more enlightened ethic. Central to
this task is understanding both why the concept of cruelty is so appealing as a tool on
behalf of anirrals and why it ultimately
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can be seen thrusting an arrow into the anus
of a dog.
A second boy holds the powerful
dog's legs, while a third controls the creature with a rope around his neck.
A fourth
dog seeks to intervene by offering Tom a
bribe to withdraw.
Yet a fifth boy is seen
to the side Witnessing the event. He draws a
primitive picture of someone hanging from the
gallows, under which appears the name "Tom
Nero."

proves inadequate if relied upon too heavily.
That is the limited task I shall approach
here, and for this purpose, Hogarth'sengravings provide an excellent pictorial starting
place.
Hogarth •s engravings [5] trace the developing cruelty of one Tom Nero, focusing on
the growth of his cruelty from childhood to
ironic reward in his own death and mutilation.
Each of the four scenes depicts a
moment displaying the inflicting or consequences of cruelty.
But none of them would
have the meaning it presently has outside the
context of the series; we are asked to take
the claim that each is a stage quite seriously.
Though each scene appears to capture an
isolatable moment, they are clearly part of
an unfolding process.
In fact, Hogarth conveys this important idea in the very title of

It is worth noting that despite all the
evident brutalization of these animals, this
dog is the only creature in the scene whose
agony is unmistakably manifested.
While one
m~ight maintain
that the rest of the characters in this scene are depicted lrore abstractly in order to draw our attention to
the central action, this does not hold up
under scrutiny.
The other characters are
depicted with varying degrees of detail, but
even when they are drawn as concretely as
Nero and this dog, the victims do not show
the effects of their suffering very clearly,
if at all.
Hogarth •s interest here and
throughout these engravings is clearly more
focused on the victimizer than on the victim.
We see quite clearly the expressions of the
children in this first stage; they are generally wearing pleasant smiles. In the case of
the boy blinding the bird, the expression
seems particularly fiendish.
The children
seem to enjoy their "play." The omission of
the agony of these victims is remarkable when
one first notices it.
Hogarth almost seems
to regard the suffering of these victims as a
distraction from his real subject matter.
The next scene, "The Second Stage of
Cruelty" (fig. 2), again reveals an abundance
of cruelty.
In the upper portion of this
scene, we find an overburdened donkey being
spurred forward with a pitchfork.
In the
center, a.beer cart driven by a fellow apparently in a drunken stupor runs over a child.
In the foreground, a shepherd clubs one of
his flock into oblivion.[6]

Figure 1
the series, "The Four Stages of Cruelty."
The cruelty Hogarth is interested in depicting cannot be understood in terms of momentary or isolatable acts but is, rather, something larger, consisting of stages.
In

"The

First Stage of Cruelty"

The first and second stages share the
theme of brutalizing animals, but the second
stage no longer involves the brutal ~ of
children.
The single exception to this involves a bull-baiting to be seen in the background of this scene. The cruelty manifested
in the second stage represents more "adult"
forms of behavior, brutalities associated
mostly with work. Interestingly, the anomalous bull-baiting is depicted as somewhat
distant from the central action of this

(fig.

1), Tom Nero is the central figure in a scene

which is nothing less than an orgy of cruelty, perpetrated almost entirely by children
upon various animals.
Amid such brutalities
as a cockfight, suspending two cats together
by the tail, and burning a bird' s eye, Tan
13
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scene, suggesting a bridge between the first
and second stages.
The "playful" cruelty
associated with childhood forms the background of the kinds' of cruelty to be found in
the lives of adults.
Indeed, this is the
central message of "The Four stages of Cruelty," and so the inclusion of the bull-bailing
is not really surprising.
It fits into the
second stage quite well, when we consider
both its placement in the second and the
over-all context of the series.
As before, Tom Nero is the central figure of the second stage.
Hog-arth seems to
suggest in this scene that Tom's flaws are
growing to include not only the brutality of
ti1e first stage but also neglect and ingratitude, as he now beats the horse that provides
his very living as a hackney coach drive .
The carriage is overloaded with men wh; :rre
both well-dressed and well-fed, apparently
penurious barristers. [7] This stage places
Nero's senseless brutality in the context of
similar abuses of beasts of burden or livestock, thus representing it not so much as an
aberration but as business as usual. In case
the variety of accepted forms of cruelty were
not great enough in this scene, Hog-arth includes advertisements on the wall to the left
for a boxing match (between one James Field
and George Taylor) as well as for cockfighting. Again, Hogarth includes the lone figure
recording Tom's ugly deeds.

Figure 2
Hallie points out that Hogarth's perspective
in "The Four Stages of Cruelty" is primarily
focused on the victimizer rather than on the
victims of cruelty. Hallie, recognizing that
this focus is common in discussions of cruelty, tries to counter-balance it by emphasizing the experience of the victim in his consideration of the nature of cruelty.
For
this reason alone, Hallie's work is unusual
and bears study.
But it is no accident that
we focus on the victimizer in our ordinary
thinking about cruelty, and Hogarth's engravings exemplify the reason for this quite
well. In the first three stages, Hogarth has
depicted something other than
individual
acts.
Cruelty is a character trait, and it
is the developnent of this trait in Tom that
we witness in these first three stages.
The
sense in which "The Four Stages of Cruelty"
represents stages at all has only to do with
the victimizer, the victims are constantly
changing.
In fact, it is through the device
of changing the victims that Hog-arth shows
the developnent from one stage to the next.
Tom's cruelty grows as his victims change:
first animals, then humans.
Finally, Torn
becomes his own victim.

The third stage, "Cruelty in Perfection"
(fig. 3), depicts the final growti1 of Tom's
cruel character.
Having impregnated his
mistress, Ann Gill, he then hacked her to
death to avoid following through on his commitment to run off with her.
The letter in
the foreground tells the story of her betraying her employer--at Torn's urging--in preparation to run off with Nero.
Scattered fram
the sack she was carrying is the silver she
stole for them.
Nero's cruelty has now led
both to the corruption and brutal murder
(note the tremendous gashes in her throat and
wrist) of another human. His cruelty has now
grown to such proportions that it is now
inflicted upon the humans closest to him.
His own expression appears to be one of revulsion at his own action.
The lone witness
of Torn's deeds of the first two stages has
now been replaced by a rrob.
But unlike the
witness of the first two stages, the rrob does
not passively observe the deeds; it now enters the action to arrest Nero.
In
B.I!.~
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Paradox of Cruelty, [8]
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The fourth stage, "The Reward of Cruelty" (fig. 4), depicts this ruination. Torn,
having been executed for Ann's murder, is
being used for an anatany lesson. [9]
Even
after his own death, Torn still pays for his
crimes through, appropriately enough, the
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give us pause in thinking that those who are
cruel to animals cannot draw the line.
If
this claim turns out to be false after all,
none of our alleged duties to animals would,
on the Kantian view, turn out to be duties at
all.
Then we would be forced to the absurd
position that there simply is nothing that
one could do to an animal that is objectionable.

violation of his own bcrlily dignity.
Despite the seriousness of the critne and
subsequent punishment, the occasion could be
taken for a light-hearted affair.
In fact,
Hog-arth seems to be conmenting as much here
on the medical profession as he is depicting
Tom's "reward. " The anatomy lesson is presided over by a rather disinterested figure
who sits beneath the emblem of the Royal
College of Physicians (which depicts the
taking of a pulse). At the upper left of the
scene, a man with a woeful expression directs
our attention to the skeleton of James Field
(the boxer whose match was advertised in the
second stage) , suggesting that Nero is to
follow him on public display.
The room is
crowed with physicians engaged in chatter,
joking, reading, or otherwise distracted from
the main event. The focal point of the scene
is Tan's head; nany lines draw attention to
it.
It ha~ been attached to a pulley by a
rather large screw placed in his skull, while
the hangman's noose remains around his neck.
In an obvious throwback to the first stage,
his eyeball is being extracted.
Despite
being dead, Nero's expression is that of
someone enduring tremendous suffering.
In
the foreground, a dog- eats Tom's heart, completing the "reward" with an ironic twist.

The No-Cruelty view is not identical
with the Kantian view.
It need not be commi tted to the pro.fX)sition that duties to
animals depend solely on their cormection to
dllties owed to htTInans.
But in identifying
cruelty as the major ill in our dealings with
animals, it shares other faults with such a
.fX)sition.
One such problem is clearly shown
in Hog-arth' s engravings.
Each act in the
first three scenes is a stage in the development of a character trait, until we find it
in its "perfection." Tan Nero's youthful
acts are, for Hog-arth, clearly cruel in light
of the later stages.
As mentioned before,
Hog-arth 's emphasis -on victimizer rather than
on victim is no accident; the concept of
cruelty places a person's character at the
heart of the matter.
It is not the victim's
character that is in. question, and this is
why it is so easy to speak of or depict
cruelty as if it has no victim.

Hog-arth thus presents us with a dramatic
depiction of the danger of cruelty:
as it
develops and grows to its
"perfection,"
i.e .. , its complete form, cruelty becomes
dangerous not only to its original victims-animals--but also lmdermines human community.
This contention, that cruelty to animals is
linked to failure to live decently in human
society, is the point that Kant approvingly
mentions in citing Hog-arth's
engravings.
Kant's view provides the log-ical extension of
what "The Four Stages of Cruelty" depicts.
If the real problem with cruelty to animals
is that it may lead us to brutalize humans,
then our abhorrence of cruelty to animals
need not be explained by attributing any
rroral status to the animals themselves.
The
likelihood that violations.of humans ensue
from cruelty to animals is sufficient on
Kant's view to explain the wrongness of cruelty to animals. In considering this view, a
rather fundamental concern should be whether
the implicit empirical claim that cruelty in
the one case leads to cruelty in the other is
correct.
There may well be sane cormection
between the two, but the ability of humans to
distinguish animals from humans in the myriad
ways we do (in both thought and deed) should

For some pur.fX)ses, focusing on the character of the perpetrator is just what is
called for.
But the language of cruelty is
in other contexts counter-productive. Focusing on cruelty, because it directs us to an
individual •s character,
can displace the
discussion in two related ways.
First, it
has a tendency to produce defenses of the
good character of of the individuals in question.
This defensiveness can be a hindrance
to genuine dialogue about what we owe to
animals in our treabnent of them.
Thus, the
usefulness of charging cruelty depends on who
one wants to have the dialogue with; it seems
generally llOre useful when speaking to a
third party than in direct dialogue with the
accused.
Second, since focusing on cruelty
draws attention to the character of individuals, this language suggest that the problem
is one of personal aberration, an individual
who has stepped outside the limits of acceptable behavior.
To suggest this is to fall
into the hands of those who wish to defend
such behavior as complying with currently
acceptable standards, i.e., the status ~.
A particularly pointed example of
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seems particularly unfit for this purp::>se.
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The undesirability of this distraction
from victim to victimizer is not the only
reason the language of cruelty proves inadequate for the work of objecting to the mass
exploitation of animals our society engages
in.
The concept of cruelty serves best when
the act or practice in question is uncontroversially objectionable.
Few who view "The
First Stage of Cruelty" would pause to ask
whether these acts are really cruel.
But
when we turn to standardly accepted uses of
animals in agriculture and science, for example, it is less obvious that the language
of cruelty is most useful. People are not as
ready to see scientists and farmers as cruel.
The No-Cruelty view suffers a theoretical difficulty that may help us understand why
the language of cruelty is unsuited to moving
people to see that the status quo is objectionable.
Of course, part of the reason for
the hesitation in seeing current practices as
cruel is simply ignorance; many are not aware
of what is really happening behind the closed
doors of the labs and the fences of the
farms.
But where there is not such ignorance, the concept of cruelty simply does not
serve well as the most fundamental ethical
category.
It fails to provide us with a
measure or criterion of what should be avoided.

Figure 3
of these p::>ints occurred recently when the
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) raided some
University of california at Riverside (UCR)
laboratories.
The newspapers covering this
event rep::>rted that a sp::>kespersonfor the
ALF charged that the experiments being conducted in these labs were cruel. The inmediate resp::>nse from the University was to cane
to the defense of the researchers, maintaining that there had been no abuses of
animals by these individuals.
Here, of
course, "abuse" means "nothing out of the
ordinary, as far as research procedures go."
As evidence of this,
the University produced
recent inspection rep::>rts from a laboratory
"accrediting" agency (MlUAC). [10] Here both
elements are represented:
the charge of
cruelty eliciting a personal defense of the
researchers and that defense consisting of
placing the researchers' behavior
within
accepted institutional standards.

What is cruelty?
Cruelty is either the
taking of pleasure in or indifference to
someone's suffering, depending on whether we
are speaking of sadistic or non-sadistic
cruelty. [ 11 ]
In either case, cruelty is a
failure to give sufficient account to suffering imposed. Now, an animal's suffering will
have been given sufficient account when we
have weighed it appropriately with respect to
its place among the other values involved in
the situation.
But how much is this?
What
place does an animal's suffering or harm have
in a scheme of values? Implicit in any judgment of cruelty is the judgment that saneone's suffering is too much, but a general
prohibition of cruelty cannot by itself tell
us how much is too much. The decision, then,
that something is cruel does not provide a
useful criterion for decisions about controversial cases; rather, it presupp::>ses an
independent means of lnaking this kind of
judgment.

Clearly, the major p::>int of the ALF's
act was lost in this exchange.
Their challenge is of a more fundamental nature than
the language of cruelty permits.
It is a
challenge to the very standards that institutions such as AAALAC and UCR appeal to in
justifying their programs of exploiting animals in the name of human benefit.
Further,
the speciesistic assumptions underlying such
justifications are what must be called into
question.
Given the CC!11IlOn understanding of
the personal nature of cruelty, this concept
BEl'WEEN THE SPECIES

The deflection of attention from victim
to victimizer in our COlTUlDn concept of cruel-
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t.y[12] is thus tied up with a range of problems. It can make us focus on the perpetratot:' without providing enough insight into
the
true locus of value, the victim, and it is
precisely this deeper insight into the value
of the victim of such institutions as factory
fanrring and scientific researd. that our
society needs.
As Hogarth so brilliantly
depicts, the language of cruelty has an imTilE BEWAIIII
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2. Irm1a.nuel Kant, "Duties to Animals
Spirits," in his Lecture~ ~ Ethics.,
trans wuis Infield (New York: Harper & Row,
1963), p. 240.

and

3. Typical state legislation protecting
animals goes under the rubric of "anti-cruelty" legislation.
See E. S. Leavitt, Animals
and Their ~~ Rights (Washington, D.C.:
Animal \'~elfare Institute, 1978). As to proanimal organizations, the names of many of
them reveal this point; the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to l'.nimals is an obvi0us example.
Insofar as humaneness is opp:>sed to cruelty, such organizations as the
Humane Society of the United States and the
American Humane Association promote the same
message in their names.
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4.
The list of significant contributions to the philosophical debate on the
moral status of animals is quite long. A few
important examples would have to include
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York:
Avon Books, 1975), Bernard. Rollin, Animal
Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, 1981), Tan Regan, The Case. !~
Animal Rights (Berkeley:
The University of
California Press, ..1983), and Steve Sapontzis,
"Moral Corrrnunity and Animal Rights," American
Phil~so'phical QUarterly XXII ( 1985 ) •

5. The illustrations here are reprinted
from J. Trusler, The Works of William Hogarth, Voltnne II (wndon: E. T. Brain & Co.,
n.d.).

Figure 4
portant place in the assessment of human
virtues and vices.
But, as Hogarth also
unwittingly reveals, our COll1IIDn notion of
cruelty cannot bear the weight that we sometimes try to put on it. If we are to reflect
the realization that animals constitute a
locus of value independent of the meaning of
our actions for ourselves, it is clear that
we must employ other concepts, such as respecting the interests and rights of animals.
Only when we see this more clearly will we
understand the important but limited role
that the concept of cruelty can play in advocating serious change in our society I s relations with animals.
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Notes
11. I am indebted to Tom Regan for first
stimulating me to think about the relation
between cruelty and animal rights.
The distinction made here can be found in his "Animal Experimentation: First Thoughts," in All
that Dwell Therein (Berkeley;
University of

1. The first half of my title is taken
from the caption that accompanies the fourth

of Hogarth I s engravings, "The Rewat:'d of Cruelty." The captions were written by Reverend
James Townley.
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California Press, 1982) and in The Case for
Anirral Rights, op. cit., p. 195-200.

"WE ARE ALL NOAH"
A FILM

BY
'Irn REX;AN

12. My arguments are aimed at what I
take to be the ordinary ooncept of cruelty.
Unfortunately, a study of Hallie's unusual
and insightful understanding of cruelty in
tenns of danination exceeds the soope of the
present paper. I believe, however, that much
of my argument oould be adapted to accommodate his insights.
For example, my claim
that a judgment of cruelty presupposes an
independent means of determining that someone's suffering is unacceptable applies also
to his acoount but must be raised in terms of
the basis for deciding that unequal lX'Ner is
objectionable.

PRODUCED BY KAY REIBOLD

(Available, Spring 1986)
"WE ARE ALL NOAH" explores the ethical
teachings of Judaism and Christianity as
they apply to various forms of human
interaction
with
nonhuman
animals.
Arrong 'the fonns =nsidered are
in science:
the use of nonhuman
animals in cosmetic and other toxicity testing
in agriculture :
intensive-rearing
or close-oonfinement systPJQS in factory fanns
in hunting: the traditions of sfOrt
and recreational hunting
in trapping:
the methods used to
secure pelts for fur coats and related products
in ccxnpanion-animal relations:
the
numbers of unwanted =mpanion anirnals killed in pounds and shelters,
and sold to research facilities.
Representative thinkers from the Jewish
and Christian religious =mmunities resfOnd to each form of interaction.
The
central questions discussed are
What should an informed, sensitive
Jew or Christian think about how
these animals are treated?
What should a responsible, compassionate Jew or Christian do in the
face of this treatment?

''WE ARE ALL NOAH" does not offer simple
answers to complex questions.
Rather,
it offers members of the Judeo-christian
religious =mmunities an oPfOrtunity to
understand what these questions are and
why men and wanen of sincere oonvictions
cannot avoid asking them, whatever their
answer.
Like Noah of old, =ntemfOrary Jews and
Christians must take resfOnsibility for

(Continued on page 49)
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